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ARGUMENT
The brief filed by the Defendants/Appellees (hereinafter referred to as "Medicine")
does not raise any legal issue not already adequately addressed by Plaintiff/Appellant
(hereinafter referred to as "Rehabilitation"), but it does create misrepresentations of fact.
In this regard and in its tone, the brief requires a reply. After reading it, one is left with
the distinct impression that it is a classic example of an old adage. If you have no law or
facts which support your position, wear a dark suit, manipulate what facts you do have
and insult the opposing party and its attorneys.
To refocus this court on the real issues in this matter, and to clarify misstatements
in Medicine's brief, Rehabilitation offers the following summary and clarification.
1. Rehabilitation appreciates Medicine pointing out that a key phrase was
inadvertently omitted from the quote of paragraph 11 in Rehabilitation's Brief. This point
is, however, meaningless as the Termination Agreement is attached as an addendum, and
it is clear that the entire brief is dedicated to the issue of whether the ownership of the
name was transferred. Rehabilitation apologizes to the court if the omission caused any
confusion. It clearly does not affect the substance of the appeal or the brief.

1
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2. To clarify the statement of the issue on appeal, the issue is not, as Medicine
would have the court believe, whether summary judgment was appropriate where it is

(

"undisputed" that the name "Sports Medicine Center" was not sold to the joint venture. If
this were the issue, we would not be before this court. The issue is whether the name was

.

sold to the joint venture, despite the fact that it was not expressly referred to in the
documents. Rehabilitation admits the name is not expressly referred to in the documents
i

which encompass the sale of the Sports Medicine Center to the joint venture, but that is
all that is "undisputed".
3. Medicine repeatedly alleges that Rehabilitation cites no law in support of its

*

position or that the law which is cited is misapplied. Contrary to these allegations, this
matter does not present complex issues of law. Rehabilitation stands by the law it cited in

.

its original brief and its application. The cases of Southern Utah Mortuary v. Olpin 776
P.2d 945 (Utah App 1989) and Sorensen v. Sorensen 769 P.2d 820 (Utah App. 1989)
clearly stand for the proposition that goodwill need not be expressly listed to be included
as an asset of a business being sold and that recognition of a name is an element of
goodwill. This holding supports Rehabilitations contention that the name need not have
been listed in order for the court to conclude it was in fact sold.
I
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4. Despite Medicine's protestations to the contrary, the issue of whether the name
was sold was raised for the first time in the Motion for Summary Judgment, the granting
of which is currently on appeal. Medicine cites the record at page 174 for its assertion
that the issue of whether the name was sold was addressed in the first motion for
summary judgment back in 1993. The citation does not support the argument. Instead, it
is clear from the record at page 174 that the only issue in the first summary judgment was
whether "all" or only a portion of the assets listed in paragraph 11 were sold. Nowhere is
the sale of the name singled out as a separate issue.
5. This misstatement of the substance of the first motion is at the heart of
Medicine's argument that Rehabilitation had the opportunity to conduct "complete
discovery" prior to the entry of summary judgment. Contrary to this assertion,
Rehabilitation did not have this opportunity. The misstatement is also problematic in that
Medicine goes on to list what evidence Rehabilitation has not produced and implies that
Rehabilitation cannot produce it because it does not exist. To argue that Rehabilitation
has no evidence of the use of the name "in [the joint venture's] business operations, in
advertising, billing patients, business letterhead, or in any ordinary business transactions"
is not the same as being able to argue evidence that Medicine in fact did none of these
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things. (And, what is the continued use of a name on a building if not "advertising" and
"ordinary business operations"?) At the very least, Rehabilitation should have been given

<

time to conduct "complete discovery" on a brand new issue.
6. Medicine presents other "facts" in such a way to create an erroneous
impression. In paragraph 12 on page 7, Medicine states that the joint venture moved
from the 3900 South location "[a]fter the IHC transaction closed". While technically true,
i

this creates the impression that the move was shortly after the closing, and this impression
is false. The joint venture did not move from 3900 South until after this lawsuit was filed
and until after the name was changed in response to the suit, which time was well in
excess of eighteen months after the closing.

*

w

7. In opposition to Rehabilitation's argument that no asset was excluded from the

'

sale, Medicine argues that to "enumerate [assets] is to exclude"them under Utah law.
However, this argument ignores the plain language of the joint venture documents.
I
Whenever assets at issue in this case are enumerated by the parties to the joint venture
documents, the language used describes that the sale encompasses "all" of the Center's
assets, "including without limitation" those items enumerated. Giving this language its
plain meaning, it, negates Medicine's argument in this regard.
i
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8. In response to Rehabilitation's argument that the ruling at issue was beyond the
scope of the previous remand, Medicine argues that the remand was only dicta and that it
is non-binding. Contrary to Medicine's argument, in the initial appeal, Rehabilitation
requested that this court not only vacate the summary judgment in Medicine's favor, but
also that this court enter summary judgment in Rehabilitation's favor, remanding only the
issue of the amount to which Rehabilitation was entitled. (See pages 31-33 of the Brief
of Appellant filed in the first appeal, a copy of which is attached in addendum 1 to this
brief for convenient reference) This court refused to do so on the basis that there
remained one factual dispute, resolution of which was necessary to establish liability.
Therefore, the issue was not "collateral" or otherwise a statement simply made in passing.
It was decided "in actuality" and "by necessary implication". D'Aston v. D'Aston 844
P.2d 345 (Utah App 1992). Medicine's due process rights cannot be deemed violated
where Medicine had full opportunity to raise the issue from the time suit was filed in
1991 through an appeal finally decided in 1995 and through a subsequent Request for
Rehearing and a Petition for Writ of Certiorari. The summary judgment is clearly subject
to being stricken as beyond the scope of this court's remand.
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CONCLUSION
Should this court decide that the lower court did not exceed the scope of its

I

remand, then on appeal of summary judgment, this court must review the facts in the light
most favorable to Rehabilitation as the non-moving party. (See. Higgins v. Salt Lake
i

County 855 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 1993) and Clover v. Snowbird Ski terorf 808 P.2d 1037, 1039
(Utah 1991)). Medicine and Rehabilitation entered into a Termination Agreement which
recognizes that Rehabilitation had an interest in the goodwill of the Sports Medicine
Center. Medicine entered into a transaction within the two year time period referred to in
the Termination Agreement, and this court has ruled that the sale of the assets was a sale

i

of "all", not one-half of the assets. Now, the issue has become whether the ownership of
the name was transferred to the joint venture as part of the sale of "all".
The lower court ruled that, since it was not an asset expressly enumerated, the
court could only find that it had not been sold. This ruling is in error as evidence in the
record is sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact. This evidence includes:
1) the joint venture sales documents themselves, which make it clear that the assets sold
to the joint venture were "all" of the assets of the Center, "without limitation"; 2) an

i

affidavit submitted by Medicine itself which admits that the name was used at least four
4
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months after the sale; and 3) two affidavits submitted by Rehabilitation which include
evidence that the name was not changed until this lawsuit was filed and that this suit was
in fact the impetus for the change. At the very least, this evidence entitles Rehabilitation
to conduct additional discovery on an issue raised for the first time in the motion at issue
on appeal, despite the years of litigation in which these parties have been engaged.
This court must reverse the Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment and remand this matter for trial, once again with very specific instructions as to
the scope of the issues remanded
DATED this /S-^day of May, 1999.
GREEN & LUHN, P.C.

tiff/ Appellant
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Based on the foregoing, and in the words of the Utah Supreme
Court in Wineqar, summary judgment was simply not appropriate.
Therefore this Court should reverse the lower court's orders and
either grant Rehabilitation's Motion for Summary Judgment or remand
the issues for trial.
ARGUMENT III
DISPUTED ISSUES OF FACT EXIST WHICH PRECLUDE
SUMMARY JUDGMENT INAPPROPRIATE.
Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
summary

judgment

is

appropriate

only

where

"the

pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law."

In addition, on appeal, the

facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom must be viewed
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.

(See Hiqqins

v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 1993).)

Applying

these principles to the facts of this case, it was inappropriate
for the court to enter summary judgment.
As

outlined

in

the

first

argument

of

this

brief,

Rehabilitation believes that, as a matter of law, the transaction
between the Appellees and IHC must be defined by an analysis of all
of the documents executed by those parties on May 24, 1990.
However, at the very least, the issue of the nature of the
transaction is a factual issue.
29

Rehabilitation should have been
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allowed to present evidence relating to the negotiations and the
ultimate outcome of the IHC transaction.
However,

even

under

the

courtfs

interpretation

of

the

Termination Agreement, there were two disputed issues of fact which
should have precluded the court from granting summary judgment.
The first issue is whether or not Sports Medicine West assumed
complete operational control of the Center, and the second issue is
whether the joint venture continued to operate the Center under the
name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center". Appellees argued that the
joint venture did not assume complete operational control because
Appellees

themselves

continued

Rehabilitation disagreed.

to

operate

the

Center.

One of the documents signed on May 24,

1990 was a Management Agreement by and between Sports Medicine West
as "Owner" and Salt Lake Knee & Sports Medicine as "Agent".
recitals state as follows:
A.
Owner is operating a rehabilitation business at
two locations in Salt Lake City, Utah (the "Business").
B.
Agent has substantial experience and expertise
in the planning, development, promotion and management of
rehabilitation businesses, and has been engaged in the
development, ownership and operation of the Business, all
of which factors may be utilized to benefit the
operations of the Business.

r

C.
Agent is desirous of entering into a management
arrangement pursuant to which Agent would undertake the
direction, supervision and performance of day-to-day
management and business development activities of the
Business, the implementation of management and financial
systems and the recommendation and implementation of
plans, budgets and other managements tools, under the
day-to-day direction of the Owner, in consideration for
which Agent would be paid a management fee.
30
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The

D.
Owner is willing to engage Agent to undertake
those activities on behalf of Owner on certain terms and
conditions set forth in the balance of this Management
Agreement.
(Emphasis added.)

(See Management Agreement submitted for in

camera review.)
It is clear from the plain and ordinary meaning of this
language that Sports Medicine West had assumed complete operational
control, and Medicine was relegated to an agency status•
Turning next to the second disputed issue, that of whether or
not the Center continued to operate at the same location under the
name

"Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center", it was directly in

dispute.

Rehabilitation

submitted

evidence

by

way

of

the

Affidavits of Greg Gardner and Doug Toole that in fact the Center
did continue to operate at the same location under the same name
until after Rehabilitation filed this law suit in October of 1991.
(R. 235 and R. 241.)

The Appellees denied this allegation and

submitted the Affidavit of Gene Oaks.

At paragraph 5, Mr. Oaks

states that the name was changed approximately one year before
Rehabilitation filed its law suit in October of 1991. (R. 272-73.)
Because both of these issues are central to the definition of
a "sale" as that term is defined in paragraph 11 of the Termination
Agreement, it was inappropriate for the court to grant summary
judgment. Given these genuine issues of material fact, this Court
should reverse the lower court's orders and remand this case for
trial.
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CONCLUSION
The lower court erred as a mater of law in looking only to the
Asset Purchase Agreement and

failing to consider all of the

documents executed by the Appellees and IHC on May 24, 1990 in
determining

the nature

of that transaction.

Had

the court

correctly considered all of the documents, it would have been clear
as a matter of law that there had, been a "sale" as that term is
defined in the Termination Agreement between the parties to this
action. The court should have granted Rehabilitation's Motion for
Summary Judgment, and the parties should have been allowed to
proceed to trial to determine the amount to which Rehabilitation is
entitled.
In addition, the court committed error by basing its ruling on
an interpretation of the Termination Agreement not propounded by
either party.

(Although had the court properly considered all the

documents by and between IHC and the Appellees, Rehabilitation
would have prevailed under the court's interpretation as well.) At
the very least, the court's interpretation created an ambiguity
entitling the parties to submit parol evidence as to their intent.
This ambiguity, together with other genuine issues of material fact
should have prevented the court from entering summary judgment.
This court should reverse the lower court's orders and grant
Rehabilitation's Motion for Summary Judgment.
be

remanded

for

a

determination

32

of

the

The case must then
amount
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to

which

Rehabilitation is entitled.

In the alternative, this court should

reverse the lower court's orders and remand all issues for trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 9th day of January, 1995.
GREEN & LUHN, P.C.

KIM/M. LflHN
At^orne/s for Plaintiff/Appellant
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